Rock around the Clock: An Agent-Based Model of Low- and High-Frequency
  Trading by Leal, Sandrine Jacob et al.
Rock around the Clock:
An Agent-Based Model of Low- and High-Frequency Trading∗
Sandrine Jacob Leal
CEREFIGE, ICN Business School, Nancy-Metz (France)†
Mauro Napoletano
OFCE, Skema Business School, Sophia-Antipolis (France)‡
Andrea Roventini
Universita` di Verona, Verona (Italy)§
Giorgio Fagiolo
Istituto di Economia, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa (Italy)¶
Abstract. We build an agent-based model to study how the interplay between low- and high-
frequency trading affects asset price dynamics. Our main goal is to investigate whether high-
frequency trading exacerbates market volatility and generates flash crashes. In the model, low-
frequency agents adopt trading rules based on chronological time and can switch between funda-
mentalist and chartist strategies. On the contrary, high-frequency traders activation is event-driven
and depends on price fluctuations. High-frequency traders use directional strategies to exploit mar-
ket information produced by low-frequency traders. Monte-Carlo simulations reveal that the model
replicates the main stylized facts of financial markets. Furthermore, we find that the presence of
high-frequency trading increases market volatility and plays a fundamental role in the generation
of flash crashes. The emergence of flash crashes is explained by two salient characteristics of high-
frequency traders, i.e., their ability to i) generate high bid-ask spreads and ii) synchronize on the sell
side of the limit order book. Finally, we find that higher rates of order cancellation by high-frequency
traders increase the incidence of flash crashes but reduce their duration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper builds an agent-based model to study how
high-frequency trading affects asset price volatility as
well as the occurrence and the duration of flash crashes
in financial markets.
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The increased frequency and severity of flash crashes
and the high volatility of prices observed in financial time
series have recently been associated to the rising impor-
tance of high-frequency trading [1]. However, the debate
in the literature about the benefits and costs of high fre-
quency trading (HFT henceforth) has not been settled
yet. On the one hand, some works stress that high-
frequency traders may play the role of modern market-
makers, providing an almost continuous flow of liquidity
[2]. Moreover, HFT reduces transaction costs and favors
price discovery and market efficiency by strengthening
the links between different markets [3]. On the other
hand, many empirical and theoretical studies raise con-
cerns about the threatening effects of HFT on the dynam-
ics of financial markets. In particular, HFT may lead to
more frequent periods of illiquidity, possibly leading to
the emergence of flash crashes [4]. Furthermore, HFT
may exacerbate market volatility [5, 6] and negatively
affect market efficiency [7].
This work contributes to the current debate on the im-
pact of HFT on asset price dynamics by developing an
agent-based model of a limit-order book (LOB) market
[51] wherein heterogeneous high-frequency (HF) traders
interact with low-frequency (LF) ones. Our main goal is
to study whether HFT helps to explain the emergence of
flash crashes and more generally periods of higher volatil-
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2ity in financial markets. Moreover, we want to shed some
light on which distinct features of HFT are relevant in
the generation of flash crashes and affect the process of
price-recovery after a crash.
In the model, LF traders can switch between funda-
mentalist and chartist strategies according to their prof-
itability. HF traders adopt directional strategies that
exploit the price and volume-size information produced
by LF traders [8, 9]. Moreover, in line with empirical
evidence on HFT [10], LF trading strategies are based
on chronological time, whereas those of HF traders are
framed in event time [52]. Consequently, LF agents,
who trade at exogenous and constant frequency, co-evolve
with HF agents, whose participation in the market is en-
dogenously triggered by price fluctuations. Finally, con-
sistent with empirical evidence [4], HF traders face limits
in the accumulation of open positions.
So far, the few existing agent-based models dealing
with HFT have mainly treated HF as zero-intelligence
agents with an exogenously-given trading frequency [6,
11]. However, only few attempts have been made to
account for the interplay between HF and LF traders
[7, 12, 13]. We improve upon this literature along several
dimensions. First, we depart from the zero-intelligent
framework by considering HF traders who hold event-
based trading-activation rules, and place orders accord-
ing to observed market volumes, constantly exploiting
the information provided by LF traders. Second, we ex-
plicitly account for the interplay among many HF and
LF traders. Finally, we perform a deeper investigation of
the characteristics of HFT that generate price downturns,
and of the factors explaining the fast price-recovery one
typically observes after flash crashes.
We study the model in two different scenarios. In the
first scenario (“only-LFT” case), only LF agents trade
with each other. In the second scenario (our baseline),
both LF and HF traders co-exist in the market. The
comparison of the simulation results generated from these
two scenarios allows us to assess the contribution of high-
frequency trading to financial market volatility and to
the emergence of flash crashes. In addition, we perform
extensive Monte-Carlo experiments wherein we vary the
rate of HF traders’ order cancellation in order to study
its impact on asset price dynamics.
Monte-Carlo simulations reveal that the model repli-
cates the main stylized facts of financial markets (i.e.,
zero autocorrelation of returns, volatility clustering, fat-
tailed returns distribution) in both scenarios. However,
we observe flash crashes together with high price volatil-
ity only when HF agents are present in the market. More-
over, we find that the emergence of flash crashes is ex-
plained by two salient characteristics of HFT, namely
the ability of HF traders (i) to grasp market liquidity
leading to high bid-ask spreads in the LOB; (ii) to syn-
chronize on the sell-side of the limit order book, trig-
gered by their event-based strategies. Furthermore, we
observe that sharp drops in prices coincide with the con-
temporaneous concentration of LF traders’ orders on the
buy-side of the book. In addition, we find that the fast
recoveries observed after price crashes result from both
a more equal distribution of HF agents on both sides of
the book and a lower persistence of HF agents’ orders in
the LOB. Finally, we show that HF agents’ order can-
cellations have an ambiguous effect on price fluctuations.
On the one hand, high rates of order cancellation im-
ply higher volatility and more frequent flash crashes. On
the other hand, they also lead to faster price-recoveries,
which reduce the duration of flash crashes.
Overall, our results validate the hypothesis that HFT
exacerbates asset price volatility, generates flash crashes
and periods of market illiquidity (as measured by large
bid-ask spreads). At the same time, consistent with the
recent academic and public debates about HFT, our find-
ings highlight the complex effects of HF traders’ order
cancellation on price dynamics [53].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the model. In Section III, we present and
discuss the simulation results. Finally, Section IV con-
cludes.
II. THE MODEL
We model a stock market populated by heterogeneous,
boundedly-rational traders. Agents trade an asset for T
periods and transactions are executed through a limit-
order book (LOB) where the type, the size and the price
of all agents’ orders are stored [54]. Agents are classified
in two groups according to their trading frequency, i.e.,
the average amount of time elapsed between two order
placements. More specifically, the market is populated
by NL low-frequency (LF) and NH high-frequency (HF)
traders (N = NL +NH). Note that, even if the number
of agents in the two groups is kept fixed over the simula-
tions, the proportion of low- and high-frequency traders
changes over time as some agents may not be active in
each trading session. Moreover, agents in the two groups
are different not only in terms of trading frequencies, but
also in terms of strategies and activation rules. A de-
tailed description of the behavior of LF and HF traders
is provided in Sections II B and II C. We first present the
timeline of events of a representative trading session (cf.
Section II A).
A. The Timeline of Events
At the beginning of each trading session t, active LF
and HF agents know the past closing price as well as
the past and current fundamental values According to
the foregoing information set, in each session t, trading
proceeds as follows:
1. Active LF traders submit their buy/sell orders to
the LOB market, specifying their size and limit
price.
32. Knowing the orders of LF traders, active HF agents
start trading sequentially and submit their buy/sell
orders. The size and the price of their orders are
also listed in the LOB.
3. LF and HF agents’ orders are matched and
executed[55] according to their price and then ar-
rival time. Unexecuted orders rest in the LOB for
the next trading session.
4. At the end of the trading session, the closing price
(P¯t) is determined. The closing price is the maxi-
mum price of all executed transactions in the ses-
sion.
5. Given P¯t, all agents compute their profits and LF
agents update their strategy for the next trading
session (see Section II B below).
B. Low-Frequency Traders
In the market, there are i = 1, . . . , NL low-frequency
agents who take short or long positions on the traded
asset. The trading frequency of LF agents is based on
chronological time, i.e. it is exogenous and constant over
time. In particular, LF agents’ trading speed is drawn
from a truncated exponential distribution with mean θ
and bounded between θmin and θmax minutes.
In line with most heterogeneous-agent models of finan-
cial markets, LF agents determine the quantities bought
or sold (i.e., their orders) according to either a fundamen-
talist or a chartist (trend-following) strategy [56]. More
precisely, given the last closing price P¯t−1, orders under
the chartist strategy (Dci,t) are determined as follows:
Dci,t = α
c(P¯t−1 − P¯t−2) + ct , (1)
where 0 < αc < 1 and ct is an i.i.d. Gaussian stochastic
variable with zero mean and σc standard deviation. If
a LF agent follows a fundamentalist strategy, her orders
(Dfi,t) are equal to:
Dfi,t = α
f (Ft − P¯t−1) + ft , (2)
where 0 < αf < 1 and ft is an i.i.d. normal random
variable with zero mean and σf standard deviation. The
fundamental value of the asset Ft evolves according to a
geometric random walk:
Ft = Ft−1(1 + δ)(1 + yt), (3)
with i.i.d. yt ∼ N(0, σy) and a constant term δ > 0.
After γL periods, unexecuted orders expire, i.e. they
are automatically withdrawn from the LOB. Finally, the
limit-order price of each LF trader is determined by:
Pi,t = P¯t−1(1 + δ)(1 + zi,t), (4)
where zi,t measures the number of ticks away from the
last closing price P¯t−1 and it is drawn from a Gaussian
distribution with zero mean and σz standard deviation.
In each period, low-frequency traders can switch their
strategies according to their profitability. At the end
of each trading session t, once the closing price P¯t is
determined, LF agent i computes her profits (pisti,t) under
chartist (st = c) and fundamentalist (st = f) trading
strategies as follows:
pisti,t = (P¯t − Pi,t)Dsti,t. (5)
Following Refs. [14–16], the probability that a LF trader
will follow a chartist rule in the next period (Φci,t) is given
by:
Φci,t =
epi
c
i,t/ζ
epi
c
i,t/ζ + epi
f
i,t/ζ
, (6)
with a positive intensity of switching parameter ζ. Ac-
cordingly, the probability that LF agent i will use a fun-
damentalist strategy is equal to Φfi,t = 1− Φci,t.
C. High-Frequency Traders
As mentioned above, the market is also populated by
j = 1, . . . , NH high-frequency agents who buy and sell
the asset [57].
HF agents differ from LF ones not only in terms of
trade speed, but also in terms of activation and trading
rules. In particular, contrary to LF strategies, which are
based on chronological time, the algorithmic trading un-
derlying the implementation of HFT naturally leads HF
agents to adopt trading rules framed in event time [10]
[58]. More precisely, we assume that the activation of
HF agents depends on the extent of price fluctuations
observed in the market. As a consequence, HF agents’
trading speed is endogenous. Each HF trader has a fixed
price threshold ∆xj , drawn from a uniform distribution
with support bounded between ηmin and ηmax. This de-
termines whether she will participate or not in the trad-
ing session t [59]:∣∣∣∣∣ P¯t−1 − P¯t−2P¯t−2
∣∣∣∣∣ > ∆xj . (7)
Active HF agents submit buy or sell limit orders with
equal probability p = 0.5 [17, 18].
Furthermore, HF traders adopt directional strategies
that try to profit from the anticipation of price move-
ments [8, 9]. To do this, HF agents exploit the price and
order information released by LF agents.
First, HF traders determine their buy (sell) order size,
Dj,t, according to the volumes available in the opposite
side of the LOB. More specifically, HF traders’ order size
is drawn from a truncated Poisson distribution whose
mean depends on volumes available in the sell(buy)-side
4of the LOB if the order is a buy (sell) order [60]. As
HF traders adjust the volumes of their orders to the ones
available in the LOB, they manage to absorb LF agents’
orders.
Second, in each trading session t, HF agents trade near
the best ask (P askt ) and bid (P
bid
t ) prices available in the
LOB [12]. This assumption is consistent with empirical
evidence on HF agents’ behavior which suggest that most
of their orders are placed very close to the last best prices
[19]. Accordingly, HF buyers and sellers’ limit prices are
formed as follows:
Pj,t = P
ask
t (1 + κj) Pj,t = P
bid
t (1− κj), (8)
where κj is drawn from a uniform distribution with sup-
port (κmin, κmax).
A key characteristic of empirically-observed high-
frequency trading is the high order cancellation rate
[4, 19]. We introduce such a feature in the model by
assuming that HF agents’ unexecuted orders are auto-
matically removed from the LOB after a period of time
γH , which is shorter than LF agents’ one, i.e. γH < γL.
Finally, at the end of each trading session, HF traders’
profits (pij,t) are computed as follows [61]:
pij,t = (P¯t − Pj,t)Dj,t. (9)
where Dj,t is the HF agent’s order size, Pj,t is her limit
price and P¯t is the market closing price.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
We investigate the properties of the model presented in
the previous section via extensive Monte-Carlo simula-
tions. More precisely, we carry out MC = 50 Monte-
Carlo iterations, each one composed of T = 1, 200 trading
sessions using the baseline parametrization, described in
Table IV. As a first step in our analysis of simulation re-
sults, we check whether the model is able to account for
the main stylized facts of financial markets (see Section
III A). We then assess whether the model can generate
flash crashes characterized by empirical properties close
to the ones observed in real data (cf. Section III B) and
we investigate the determinants of flash crashes (cf. Sec-
tion III C). Finally, we study post flash-crash recoveries
by investigating the consequences of different degrees of
HF traders’ order cancellation on model dynamics (see
Section III D).
A. Stylized Facts of Financial Markets
How does the model fare in terms of its ability to repli-
cate the main statistical properties of financial markets?
First, in line with the empirical evidence of zero autocor-
relation detected in price returns [20–22], we find that
model-generated autocorrelation values of price-returns
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FIG. 1: Box-Whisker plots of price-returns autocorrelations.
Each plot relates to auto-correlation values for a given lag
across independent 50 Monte-Carlo runs.
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FIG. 2: Sample autocorrelation functions of absolute price
returns (solid line) and squared price returns (dashed line).
Values are averages across independent 50 Monte-Carlo runs.
(calculated as logarithmic differences) do not reveal any
significant pattern and are always not significantly differ-
ent from zero (see the box-whisker plots in Figure 1) [62].
Moreover, in contrast to price returns, the autocorrela-
tion functions of both absolute and squared returns dis-
play a slow decaying pattern, which is more pronounced
in the case of absolute returns (cf. Figure 2). This indi-
cates the presence of volatility clustering in our simulated
data [23–25]. Note also that such autocorrelation values
are very similar to empirically-observed ones [26].
Another robust statistical property of financial mar-
kets is the existence of fat tails in the distribution of price
returns. To investigate the presence of such a property
in our simulated data, we plot in Figure 3 the density of
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FIG. 3: Density of pooled price returns (stars) across 50 inde-
pendent Monte-Carlo runs together with a Normal fit (solid
line). Logarithmic scale on y-axis. Densities are estimated
using a kernel density estimator using a bandwidth optimized
for Normal distributions.
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FIG. 4: Complementary cumulative distribution of negative
price returns (circles) together with power-law fit (dashed
line). Double-logarithmic scale.
pooled returns across Monte-Carlo runs (stars) together
with a normal density (solid line) fitted on the pooled
sample. As the figure shows quite starkly, the distribu-
tion of price returns significantly departs from the Gaus-
sian benchmark [23, 26]. The departure from normality
is particularly evident in the tails (see Figure 4), which
are well approximated by a power-law density [27].
TABLE I: Volatility and flash-crash statistics across different
scenarios. Values are averages across 50 independent Monte-
Carlo runs. Monte-Carlo standard errors in parentheses.
Scenario σP Number of Avg. duration of
flash crashes flash crashes
Baseline scenario 0.020 8.800 14.069
(0.001) (0.578) (0.430)
Only-LFT scenario 0.005 - -
(0.001) - -
B. Stylized Facts of Flash Crashes
Our model appears to be quite successful in replicat-
ing the “standard” stylized facts about financial markets.
However, is it able to account for the emergence of flash
crashes [4, 19]? Simulations results provide a positive
answer. In line with the evidence presented in Ref. [4]
about the flash crash of May 6th, 2010, we identify flash
crashes as drops in the asset price of at least 5% followed
by a sudden recovery of 30 minutes at maximum (cor-
responding to thirty trading sessions in each simulation
run). Applying such a definition, we find that the model
is able to endogenously generate flash crashes and their
frequency is significantly higher than one (see the third
column of Table I).
Furthermore, the model is also able to account for an-
other relevant and recent stylized fact observed during
flash crashes, namely the negative correlation between
price and volumes [4]. To illustrate this, we report in Ta-
ble II unconditional correlations between price returns
and total volumes as well as correlation values condi-
tioned on two distinct market phases: “flash crashes”
(which includes price crashes and subsequent recoveries)
and “normal times” (where we excluded all observations
regarding flash crashes). Normal times are characterized
by a weak but positive correlation between returns and
volumes, which is also reflected in the low value of the un-
conditional correlations. In contrast, correlations turns
out to be negative and much more significant during flash
crashes. HF traders do appear to be responsible for this
result: HFT volume displays a significant negative cor-
relation with returns during flash crashes, whereas LFT
volumes are always positively correlated with price re-
turns (see the second and third columns of Table II).
The above findings suggest a significant role of HF
traders during flash crashes. However, how relevant is
high-frequency trading for the emergence of the afore-
mentioned stylized facts, and more generally of flash
crashes? To check this, we carry out a Monte-Carlo ex-
ercise in a scenario wherein only low-frequency traders
are present (“only-LFT” scenario). The comparison be-
tween such a scenario and the baseline one reveals that
the main stylized facts observed in financial markets are
reproduced also when we remove HF agents [63]. In con-
6TABLE II: Correlation values between price returns and dif-
ferent types of orders volumes. Values are averages across 50
independent Monte-Carlo runs. Monte-Carlo standard errors
in parentheses.
Total volume HFT volume LFT volume
Unconditional 0.018 0.012 0.096
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Flash crashes -0.112 -0.113 0.030
(0.028) (0.028) (0.031)
Normal times 0.023 0.016 0.103
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
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FIG. 5: Evolution of asset price (solid line) and bid-ask spread
(dashed line) in a single Monte-Carlo run.
trast, when the market is populated only by LF traders,
flash crashes do not emerge (cf. Table I). Moreover, price
returns volatility significantly drops providing further ev-
idence on the destabilizing role of high-frequency trading.
To sum up, our results confirm that the model is able
to reproduce the main stylized facts of financial markets.
Furthermore, they indicate that the emergence of flash
crashes is strongly related to the presence of HF traders
in the market. In the next section, we further spotlight
flash crashes, studying which features of high-frequency
trading are more responsible for their emergence.
C. The Anatomy of Flash Crashes
Let us begin considering the evolution of the asset
price and bid-ask spread in a single simulation run (cf.
Figure 5). The plot reveals that sharp drops in the as-
set price tend to be associated with periods of large
bid-ask spreads (see Ref. [28] for empirical evidence
on the relation between liquidity fluctuations and large
price changes). This piece of evidence suggests that flash
crashes emerge when market liquidity is very low.
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FIG. 6: Complementary cumulative distributions of bid-ask
spreads in different market phases. Pooled sample from 50
independent Monte-Carlo runs.
To shed more light on the relation between flash
crashes and market liquidity, we compute the distribu-
tions of bid-ask spreads conditioned on different market
phases. More precisely, we construct the pooled samples
(across Monte-Carlo runs) of bid-ask spread values sin-
gling out “normal times” phases (see also Section III B)
and decomposing “flash-crash” periods in “crash” phases
(i.e. periods of sharp drops in the asset price) and the
subsequent “recovery” phases (periods when the price
grows back to its pre-crisis level). Next, we estimate
the complementary cumulative distributions of bid-ask
spreads in each market phase using a kernel-density es-
timator. The distributions plotted in Figure 6 confirm
what we have learned from the visual inspection of price
and bid-ask spread dynamics in a single simulation run.
Indeed, the mass of the distribution of bid-ask spreads
is significantly shifted to the right during flash crashes
vis-a`-vis normal times.
The aforementioned switches between periods of high
and low market liquidity (i.e., between periods of low
and high bid-ask spreads) are explained by the different
strategies employed by high- and low-frequency traders
in our model. Active LF traders set their order prices
“around” the closing price of the last trading session.
This behavior tends to fill the gap existing between the
best bid and ask prices at the beginning of a given trad-
ing section. Instead, active HF traders send their orders
after LF agents and place large buy (sell) orders just few
ticks above (below) the best ask (bid). Such a pricing be-
havior widens the difference between bid and ask prices
in the LOB. As a consequence, the directional strategies
of HF traders can lead to wide bid-ask spreads, setting
the premises for the emergence of flash crashes. How-
ever, large spreads are not enough to generate significant
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FIG. 7: Kernel densities of shares of sell order volume over
total order volume of the same agent type (HFTs: solid line,
LFTs: dashed line). Normal times.
drops in the closing price if LF and HF agents’ orders are
evenly distributed in the LOB between the buy and sell
sides. Accordingly, as the closing price is the maximum
price of all executed transactions in the book, an even
distribution of orders should lead to small fluctuations in
the closing price. In contrast, extreme price fluctuations
require concentration of orders on one side of the book.
To further explore such conjecture, we analyze the dis-
tributions of shares of sell order volumes in the book
made by each type of agent (HF or LF traders) over the
total volume within the same category. This ratio cap-
tures the concentration of the orders on the sell side of
the LOB disaggregated for agents’ type. In particular,
the more the sell concentration ratio is close to one, the
more a given category of agents (e.g., HF traders) is fill-
ing the LOB with sell orders. Figures 7 and 8 compare
kernel densities of the foregoing sell concentration ratios
for HF and LF agents in normal times and crashes, re-
spectively. Let us start examining the latter. First, Fig-
ure 8 shows that during crashes the supports of the LF
and HF traders’ distributions do not overlap. This hints
to a very different behavior of LF and HF agents during
flash crashes. Second, during crash times, LF and HF
traders’ orders are concentrated on opposite sides of the
LOB. More specifically, the mass of the distribution of
LF agents’ orders is concentrated on the buy side of the
book, whereas the mass of the HF traders’ distribution is
found on very high values of the sell concentration ratio
(see Figure 8). These extreme behaviors are not observed
during normal times (cf. Figure 7). Indeed, in tranquil
market phases, the supports of the LFT and HFT den-
sities overlap and they encompass the whole support of
the sell concentration statistic.
We further study the above differences in order behav-
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FIG. 8: Kernel densities of shares of sell order volume over
total order volume of the same agent type (HFTs: solid line,
LFTs: dashed line). Flash Crashes.
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FIG. 9: Complementary cumulative distribution of shares of
sell order volume over total orders volume of the same agent
type for different market phases. HFT orders.
ior, analyzing the complementary cumulative distribu-
tions of the sell concentration statistic for the same type
of agent and across different market phases (cf. Figures
9 and 10). The complementary cumulative distributions
confirm that flash crashes are generated by the concentra-
tion of HF and LF orders on opposite sides of the LOB.
Indeed, during flash crashes, the distribution of HF or-
ders significantly shifts to the sell side of LOB, whereas
the one of LF orders moves to the left, revealing a strong
concentration on buy orders.
The above discussion shows that flash crashes are a
true emergent property of the model generated by the
joint occurrence of three distinct events: i) the presence
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FIG. 10: Complementary cumulative distribution of shares of
sell order volume over total order volume of the same agent
type for different market phases. LFT orders.
of a large bid-ask spread; ii) a strong concentration of HF
traders’ orders on the sell side of the LOB; iii) a strong
concentration of LF traders’ orders on the buy side of
the LOB. In particular, the first two elements are in line
with the empirical evidence about the market dynamics
observed during the flash crash of May 6th, 2010 [4, 19]
and confirm the key role played by high-frequency trading
in generating such extreme events in financial markets.
Indeed, the emergence of periods of high market illiquid-
ity is intimately related to the pricing strategies of HF
traders (see Eq. 8). Moreover, and in line with previous
agent-based models in the literature [14–16], the synchro-
nization of LF traders on the buy side of the LOB can be
explained on the grounds of profitability-based switching
behavior by such type of agents (see Section II B).
The concentration of HF traders’ orders on the sell side
of the book is at first glance more puzzling, given that
the choice of each HF agent between selling or buying is
a Bernoulli distributed variable with probability p = 0.5.
However, the spontaneous synchronization of orders be-
comes possible once we consider that HF agents adopt
event-time trading strategies, which lead to the emer-
gence of price-dependent activation processes (cf. Eq. 7).
Indeed, the fact that the type of order choice is Bernoulli-
distributed implies that the total number of sell orders
placed by active HF traders in any given session is a
binomially-distributed random variable dependent on the
number of active HF agents. More precisely, let n be the
number of active HF traders at time t, the probability
that a fraction k of these agents place a sell order is:
(
n
nk
)
pnk(1− p)n(1−k),
and it is inversely related to n. Hence, the endogenous ac-
tivation of HF traders coupled with heterogeneous price
activation thresholds can considerably shrink the sample
of active HF agents in a trading session. The smaller
sample size increases the probability of observing a con-
centration of HF agents’ orders on the sell side of the
LOB which can be conducive to the emergence of a flash
crash.
D. Accounting for Post-Crash Recoveries
A hallmark of flash crash episodes is the fast recoveries
that follow the initial huge price drop. Which factors are
responsible for such rapid switches in price dynamics?
Figures 6 and 9 provide insightful information on the
characteristics of the post flash-crash recoveries. First,
the distribution of the bid-ask spreads in a recovery is
not statistically different from the one observed in nor-
mal times (see Figure 6). This shows that high spreads
are not persistent and the market is able to quickly re-
store good liquidity conditions after a crash. Moreover,
the high concentration of HF traders on the sell side of
the book disappears after the crash (cf. Figure 9). In-
deed, the distribution of the concentration ratios during
recoveries is not different from the one observed in nor-
mal times.
Two particular features of the model explain the char-
acteristics of the recovery phases depicted above. The
first is the surge in the order volumes of HF agents in
the aftermath of a crash. Wide variations in the asset
prices indeed trigger the activation of a large number
of high-frequency traders. Accordingly, their orders will
tend to be equally split between the sell and buy sides
of the LOB (see the discussion in Section III C above),
as it is also shown by the leftward shift of the distribu-
tion of the sell concentration ratio during recoveries (cf.
Figure 9). This fast increase of the order volumes of HF
agents contributes to explain the quick recovery of the
closing price, as now more and more contracts will be
executed at prices close to both the best bid and ask.
The second element supporting the rapid price recovery
is the order-cancellation rate of HF traders. In line with
empirical evidence [29], order cancellation of HF agents
is very high in the baseline scenario, as all unexecuted
orders are withdrawn at the end of each trading session
(see also Table IV). Such “extreme” order-cancellation
behavior of HF traders implies that their bid and ask
quotes always reflect current market conditions (we call
it order-memory effect, which in this case is low). This
explains the low time persistence of high bid-ask spreads
after a crash and contributes to the quick recovery of
market liquidity and price.
The foregoing considerations point to a positive role
played by fast HF traders’ order cancellation in restoring
good market conditions thus explaining the low duration
of flash crashes. However, high order cancellation rates
also indicate high aggressiveness of HF traders in exploit-
9TABLE III: HF traders’ order cancellation rates, price volatil-
ity and flash crash statistics. Values are averages across 50
independent Monte-Carlo runs. Monte-Carlo standard errors
in parentheses.
γH σP Number of Avg. duration of
flash crashes flash crashes
1 0.020 8.800 14.069
(0.001) (0.578) (0.430)
5 0.013 3.095 17.376
(0.001) (0.231) (0.729)
10 0.010 2.138 20.076
(0.001) (0.155) (0.809)
15 0.009 1.667 18.952
(0.001) (0.137) (1.091)
20 0.007 1.000 24.000
(0.001) (0.001) (1.259)
ing the orders placed by LF agents in the LOB (we call
it liquidity-fishing effect). This favors the emergence of
high bid-ask spreads in the market thus increasing the
probability of observing a large fall in the asset price.
To further explore the role of HF traders’ order can-
cellation on price fluctuations, we perform a Monte-Carlo
experiment where we vary the number of periods an un-
executed HFT order stays in the book (measured by the
parameter γH), while keeping all the other parameters at
their baseline values. The results of this experiment are
reported in Table III. We find that a reduction in the or-
der cancellation rate (higher γH , see Table III) decreases
market volatility and the number of flash-crash episodes
[64]. This outcome stems from the lower aggressiveness
of HF traders’ strategies as order cancellation rates de-
crease, i.e. the liquidity-fishing effect becomes weaker. In
contrast, the duration of flash crashes is inversely related
to the order cancellation rate (cf. fourth column of Table
III). This outcome can be explained by the order-memory
effect. As γH increases, the bid and ask quotes posted by
HF agents stay longer in the LOB thus raising the num-
ber of contracts traded at prices close to the crash one.
In turn, this hinders the recovery of the market price.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We developed an agent-based model of a limit-order
book (LOB) market to study how the interplay between
low- and high-frequency traders shapes asset price dy-
namics and eventually leads to flash crashes. In the
model, low-frequency traders can switch between funda-
mentalist and chartist strategies. High-frequency (HF)
traders employ directional strategies to exploit the order
book information released by low-frequency (LF) agents.
In addition, LF trading rules are based on chronological
time, whereas HF ones are framed in event time, i.e. the
activation of HF traders endogenously depends on past
price fluctuations.
We showed that the model is able to replicate the
main stylized facts of financial markets. Moreover, the
presence of HF traders generates periods of high market
volatility and sharp price drops with statistical proper-
ties akin to the ones observed in the empirical literature.
In particular, the emergence of flash crashes is explained
by the interplay of three factors: i) HF traders caus-
ing periods of high illiquidity represented by large bid-
ask spreads; ii) the synchronization of HF traders’ orders
on the sell-side of the LOB; iii) the concentration of LF
traders on the buy side of the book.
Finally, we have investigated the recovery phases that
follow price-crash events, finding that HF traders’ order
cancellations play a key role in shaping asset price volatil-
ity and the frequency as well as the duration of flash
crashes. Indeed, higher order cancellation rates imply
higher market volatility and a higher occurrence of flash
crashes. However, we establish that they speed up the
recovery of market price after a crash. Our results sug-
gest that order cancellation strategies of HF traders cast
more complex effects than thought so far, and that regu-
latory policies aimed at curbing such practices (e.g., the
imposition of cancellation fees, see also Ref. [30]) should
take such effects into account.
Our model could be extended in at least three ways.
First, we have made several departures from the zero-
intelligence framework, which has been so far the stan-
dard in agent-based models of HFT. However, one can
play with agents’ strategic repertoires even further. For
example, one could allow HF traders to switch between
sets of different strategies with increasing degrees of so-
phistication. Second, we have considered only one asset
market in the model. However, taking into account more
than one market would allow one to consider other rele-
vant aspects of HFT and flash crashes such as the pos-
sible emergence of systemic crashes triggered by sudden
and huge price drops in one market [19]. In addition,
another salient feature of HF traders is the ability to
rapidly process and profit from the information coming
from different markets i.e., latency arbitrage strategies
[7]. Third, and finally, one could employ the model as
a test-bed for a number of policy interventions directed
to affect high-frequency trading and therefore mitigating
the effects of flash crashes. Besides the aforementioned
example of order cancellation fees, the possible policy list
could include measures such as the provision of different
types of trading halt facilities and the introduction of a
tax on high-frequency transactions.
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TABLE IV: Parameters values in the baseline scenario
Description Symbol Value
Monte Carlo replications MC 50
Number of trading sessions T 1, 200
Number of low-frequency traders NL 10, 000
Number of high-frequency traders NH 100
LF traders’ trading frequency mean θ 20
LF traders’ min and max trading frequency [θmin, θmax] [10,40]
Chartists’ order size parameter αc 0.04
Chartists’ shock standard deviation σc 0.05
Fundamentalists’ order size parameter αf 0.04
Fundamentalists’ shock standard deviation σf 0.01
Fundamental value shock standard deviation σy 0.01
Price drift parameter δ 0.0001
LF traders’ price tick standard deviation σz 0.01
LF traders’ intensity of switching ζ 1
LF traders’ resting order periods γL 20
HF traders’ resting order periods γH 1
HF traders’ activation threshold distribution support [ηmin, ηmax] [0,0.2]
Market volumes weight in HF traders’ order λ 0.625
size distribution
HF traders’ order price distribution support [κmin, κmax] [0,0.01]
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